Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

Robert J. Erishman and Darlyne L. Erishman v.
Marr B. Overman : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Sherma Hansen; Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Erishman v. Overman, No. 9226 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3635

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE sT ATEroF ~T AH
-------

R0 BERT

~

'" f.~~,.,,,·-~ 3
':

1
~

960

J. ERISH MAN ami·---·-- a;;~.:·=---~::;;;.;~ ·c~~;;:;-u·t~h--

l)ARI_JYNE I__J. ERISHMAN, his wife,
P/([illtiffs and Appellants,
vs.
~IARR

-

D

BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS
Case No. 9226

B. OVERMAN,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of Cache County, Utah

Honorable Lewis Jones, District Judge

SHERMA HANSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------

5

STATEMENT OF POINTS --------------------------------------------

8

ARGUMENT' ----------------------------------------------------------------- ___ 10
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 3
AND 7; ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUMBERED 1, 2, 3 AND 4; AND ITS JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE DEF'ENDANT ------------------------------ 10
A. THE EVIDENCE IN FACT, AND CONTRARY
TO THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 3, SHOWS THAT THE MATTER OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION WAS CONNECTED TO T'HE
SEWER Wi-\.S IMMATERIAL TO THE RESPONDENT; THE LAW, WHEN SUCH IS
THE EVIDENCE, DOES NOT JUSTIFY A
RECISSION, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S
CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 1 ______________ 10
B. THE EVID~ENCE, CONTRARY TO THE
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 7,
IS CONTRADICTORY AND INCONCLUSIVE
AND· FAILS TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S
CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 2 AS TO
THE AMOUNT IN WHICH THE IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENT ENHANCED THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY __ 13
C. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS, AS IS INDICATE'D
BY THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 5, THAT THE RESPONDENT WAIVED
ANY MISREPRESENTATION THERE MAY
HAVE BEEN AND SHOWED BY HER ACSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TIONS THAT SHE ELECTED TO SEEK
DAMAGES; THE LAW IN SUCH CASES
BEING, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUMBERS 1 AND· 3,
THAT RESPONDENT THEN HAD NO RIGHT
TO RESCIND ________________ ------------------------------------------ 18
POINT 2
THAT THE PARTIES HAD IN FACT SIGNED
AN EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE, WHICH WAS A
BINDING CONTRACT UPON THE PARTIES,
AND WHICH CONTRACT DID NOT PURPORT TO CONVEY A HOUSE CONNECTED
TO A SEWER LINE ---------------------------------------------- 21
POINT 3
A. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 8 WHEREIN IT
FOUND ''THAT EXCEPT AS ABOVE EXCEPTED ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF
COUNTERCLAIM ARE TRUE AND CORRECT AND THOSE CONTAINED IN THE
COMPLAINT INCORRECT" ------------------------------ 22
B. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN MAKING
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER I
WHEREIN IT STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RESCISSION OF
THE CONTRACT ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THE PREMISES WERE MATERIALLY MISREPRESENTED TO HER, FOR THE REASON
AND ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONTRACT RELIED UPON BY THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY TERMINATED AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (Tr. 1) AND ADMITTED IN DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM. (TR. 7) ______ 22
CON CL USI 0 N ------------------------------------------------------------------ 25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

REFEH.ENC~ES

CITED

Page No.
Cases Cited
Patterson vs. McComas, 37 N.E. 2nd 65.5 __________________ 12
Carpenter vs. First Trust & Sav. Bank, ( 1936), 54 P.
2nd 495 (California), 134 A. L. R. 1064 ________________ 19
Kerns vs. Bank of Manitou, 242 P. 2nd 817
Colorado) ------------------------------ __ _____ _______ ___ ____ _______ ____ __ ____ 20
Hawkins vs. Stoffers ( 1929), 276 P. 452
(Wyoming) ----------------------------------------------~----------------- 20
Eckhause vs. Berwyn Estate ( 19'29) 146 A. 65
(New Jersey) __________________________________________ '___ ·_________________ 20
Peck vs. Judd, 326 P. 712; 7 Utah 2nd 420 ------------------ 21
West vs. Walker, (1930), 231 N. W. 826
(Minn.), 74 A. L. R. 165 ---------------------------------------- 25
Utah Statutes Cited
Title 78, Chapter 36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) 24
Authorities Cited
9 Am. Jur. - Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 32,
p. 377 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
23 Am. Jur.- Fraud and Deceit, Sec. 117, Page 902 __ 12
23 Am. Jur. - Fradulent Deceit, Sec. 112, Page 896.. 13
37 C. J. S. -Statute of Frauds, Sec 141, Page 624 ____ 17
37 C. J. S. -Statute of Frauds, Sec. 142, Page 629 ____ 17
12 Am. Jur. - Contracts, See 447, Page 1029 ____________ 21
Degnan, "Parol Evidence, The Utah Verson,"
5 Utah Law Review, No. 2, Page 162 ---------------------- 22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-.5-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. ERISH1v1AN and
DARLYNE L. ERISHMAN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
~/IAI~R

BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS
Case No. 9226

B. OVERMAN,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was originally commenced by Plaintiffs
for the purpose of recovering possession of certain real
property owned and conveyed by them to Defendant
under the te1ms of Escrow Agreement, subsequent to forfeiture of the Escrow Agreement by the plaintiffs for the
default of the Defendant, and to further recover payments
due, attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to the provisions
of the said Escrow Agreement, and treble damages for unlawul detainer by Defendant. Plaintiffs were granted
possession of the said premises upon the completion of the
District Court trial; with the Court awarding to the defendant the sums of money paid by her on the purchase
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6price of said property, the value of certain improvements
made by her upon the said property, interest thereon, and
costs from which portion of the judgment plaintiffs now
appeal.
Appellants and Respondent, on or about the 20th day
of March, 1957, entered into an Escrow Agreement, by
the terms of which the party of the second part, Respondent, was to pay the parties of the first part, Appellants,
the sum of $50.74 per month, on or before the 1st day of
each month. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 10 shows that the
respondent was, after the first four n1onths, continually
late with payments and in March of 1958 completely
missed a payment and again in July of 1958, and that she
made her last payment on August 1, 1958, being at that
time two payment delinquent. Appellants spoke with respondent about bringing these payments up to date (R 42,
43, 100) with respondent agreeing to do so.
Prior to making the August payment, respondent
write to appellants requesting that they agree to a refinancing proposition to help respondent out of financial
difficulties in which she found herself because of certain
alleged improvements she had made in the home (De£.
Ex 1 ) . Appellant agreed to taking a second mortgage
and a cash settlement ( Def. Ex. 2), subject to arrangements being made for the making of the delinquent payments, and ·the receipt of a schedule of the amount that
would be due under the second Inortgage.
Subsequently, it was lean1ed by respondent that the
property was not connected to the sewer and she wrote
to appellants as follows:
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-7"I am perfectly aware that the installation of my
furnace is n1y responsibility, as is the repair to the
back steps and the cleaning of the lot. However, I
do feel that you have some responsibility regarding
the sewer connection." (De£. ~x. 2)
Appellants replied that they would make a $100 allowance
for the connection of the sewer ( Def. Ex. 4) and, as indicated in n~efendant's Exhibit 5, informed respondent, prior
to September 19, 1958, that they would not accept a
second 1nortgage.
Respondent wrote appellants ( Def. Ex. 5) that she
had consulted an attorney and had been told that the cost
of the sewer connection should be all appellants' ( Def. Ex.
5) and requested that the sewer connection costs be
credited on the Escrow Agreement.
Respondent made no further payments on the Escrow
Agreement and was informed the 1st part of December
that if she did not bring her payments up to date, appellants would declare a forfeiture of the contract. Respondent's response was to inform appellants' attorney that
she had tried to secure financing, had been unsuccessful
and had asked the real estate department of the company
where she worked to sell the home. She also stated that
she would start reducing the balance due on the contract
by monthly payments, and this as late as February 5, 1959
(De£. Ex 6).
There were no payments made on the Escrow Agreement and on the 12th day of March, 1959, appellants
caused Notice Declaring Escrow Agreement Null and
Void to be served on the escrow agent, the First Security
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Bank of Utah, N. A., Logan, Utah, and Notice of Forfeiture of Escrow Agreement to be served upon Man· B.
Overman (Tr. 5, 6)
Respondent refused to vacate the premises after the
forfeiture and thereupon, on the 22nd day of May, 1959,
plaintiffs filed their Complaint ( Tr. 1) seeking resitution
and possession of the premises, treble damages for rentals
accn1ed during the period of time respondent held the
premises, for payments actually due on the premises, and
for attorney's fees and costs.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection with this appeal, Plaintiff contends:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 3 AND 7;
ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUMBERED 1, 2, 3,
AND 4; AND ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEFENDANT.
A. THE EVIDENCE IN FACT, AND· CONTRA.RY
TO THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 3,
SHOWS THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS CONNECTED
TO THE SEWER WAS IMMATERIAL TO THE RESPONDENT; THE LAW, WHEN SUCH IS THE EVID·ENCE, DOES NOT JUSTIFY A RECISSION, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW
NUMBER 1.
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B. THE EVIDENCE, CONrfRARY TO THE
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUJ\1BER 7, IS CONTRADICTORY AND INCONCLUSIVE AND FA.ILS TO
SUPPOI\T THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW
NUMBER 2 AS TI-IE AJ\!IOUNT IN WHICH THE IJ\!1PROVEMENTS J\JADE BY RESPONDENT ENHANCED TI-IE \T ALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
C. TI-IE EVIDENCE SHOWS, AS IS INDICATED
BY THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUJ\1BER 5,
Tl-IAT THE RESPONDENT WAIVED ANY MISREPRESENTATION THERE J\IIAY HAVE BEEN AND
SHOWED BY HER ACTIONS THAT SHE ELECTED
TO SEEK DAJ\1AGES; THE LAW IN SUCH CASES
BEING, CON1,RARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUMBERS 1 AND 3, THAT RESPONDENT THEN HAD NO RIGHT TO RESCIND.
POINT 2
THAT THE PARTIES HAD IN FACT SIGNED AN
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT TO
PURCHASE, WHICH WAS A BINDING CONTRACT
UPON THE PARTIES, AND WHICH CONTRACT DID
NOT PURPORT TO CONVEY A HOUSE CONNECTED
TO A SEWER LINE.
POINT 3
A. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING OF Fi-\CT NUMBER 8 WHEREIN IT FOUND
"THAT EXCEPT AS ABOVE EXCEPTED, ALL OF THE
ALLEGATIONS OF COUNTERCLAIM ARE TRUE
AND CORRECT AND THOSE CONTAINED IN THE
COMPLAINT INCORRECT."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN MAKING
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 1 WHEREIN
IT STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED
TO A RECISSION OF THE CONTRACT ON THE
GROUNDS TI-IAT THE PREMISES WERE Iv1ATERIALLY MISREPRESENTED~ TO HER, FOR THE REASON AND ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONTRACT
RELIED UPON BY 'fHE D·EFENDANT HAD BEEN
PREVIOUSLY TERMINATED AS ALLEGED IN
PLAIN.TIFFS' C0~1PLAINT (TR.1) AND ADMITTED
IN DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM. (TR. 7)
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
·THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 3, 7 AND
8; ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NU!v1BERED 1, 2, 3
AND 4, AND: ITS JUDGMENT AND DECREE IN
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT.
A. THE EVIDENCE IN FACT, AND CONTRARY
TO THE COURT~S FINDING OF FACT NO.3, SHOWS
THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS CONNECTED TO
TI-IE SEWER WAS I~\1rv1ATERIAL TO THE RESPONDEN'T; THE LAW, WHEN SUCH IS THE EVIDENCE~
DOES NOT JUSTIFY A RECISSION, CONTRARY TO
THE COURT'C CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 1.

There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to
show that respondent "made particular note" (Finding of
Fact No. 3) of the statement that the property was con-
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nected to the Logan City Sewer line.
n1onv
. would indicate the contrarv.

In fact, the testi-

~

Q But you did go do\vn and investigate some of the
items on the listing agreement, didn't you?

A That's right.

Q

To make sure they were there and to make sure
everything was all right. Did you contact anyone
at all about the sewer connection?

A No, I did not.

Q You didn't call the City?
A No.

Q

You didnt' ask Mr. Baugh about it other than to
observe the listing?

A Yes, I did. That is, I didn't ask him. He quoted
to me that "I have a home that is connected to the
sewer, it's down close to the school, it's within
walking distance from town," and he said, it's
completely furnished."

Q

Now, did you ask Mr. Erisman about the home?

A No.

Q Did you ask Mrs. Erisman about the home?
A No.

Q

Did you talk with them at all?

A No ...
The law under these circumstances is well established.
"A "mistake of fact," warranting cancellation of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contract for sale of land . . . must be material to contract and affect substance thereof, and must affect
both parties in reference to the same fact which,
though connected with agreement, is merely incidental and not a part of its subject matter or essential to any of its terms."
Patterson vs. McComas, 37 N E 2d 655
"... before granting relief it must be made to appear
that the fact concerning which the mistake was made
was one that animated and controlled the conduct of
the parties. The court must be satisfied that but for
the mistake the complainant would not have assumed
the obligation fron1 which he seeks to be relieved."
9 Am. Jur. - Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 32, P.
377
"To entitle one either to maintain an action of deceit
because of false representations or to rescind a K
made made in relance thereon, it must appear that
such representations were made for the purpose of
influencing the complaining party, and w/ the intent
that they be acted upon by him, or in a manner
naturally calculated to induce him to act upon them."
23 Am. Jur. - Fraud and Deceit,~~ec. 117, P. 902.
The evidence further shows that respondent was
active in business, that she had worked in various departments of a real estate and loaning business; that she had
been responsible for drawing legal papers, for closing and
processing loans ( R 44, 45, 46) and in general was most
familiar with all, or nearly all, phases of real estate transactions.
The respondent thus had every opportunity, and
every reason, because of her knowledge and experience,
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to insert the matter of the sewer connection in the space
provided, had she considered it important.
American Jurisprudence in Volume 23, Fraud and
Deceit, Section 112, page 896, sets forth the general rule
under such circumstances:
"The contract itself may show that certain representations were not regarded as material, as where the
complaining party could have inserted provisions
therein to protect himself against the contingencies
covered by the representations, but failed to do so.
The preliminary contract of the parties in this case
did not show the sewer connection to be considered material. It therefore appears that the verdict of the jury
as to the materiality of the sewer connection, the Court's
Finding of Fact Number 3 and Its Conclusion of Law
Number 1, particularly wherein the Court states that the
"defendant's signing of the real estate contract was induced by a material misrepresentation of the plaintiffs
to the effect that the sewer on said premises was connected
to the Logan City Sewer," are wholly and completely unsupported by the evidence.
POINT I

B
THE EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 7, IS CONTRADICTORY AND INCONCLUSIVE AND FAILS TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 2 AS TO THE AMOUNT IN WHICH THE IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENT ENHANCED THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is considerable confusion in the record as to
the value of the capital improvement placed upon the
premises by the respondent.
Mr. Glen P. Baugh, the real estate agent who sold the
home to respondent, was asked by the Court ( R 67) :
"How much would that house, how much could it be
n1oved for on time?"

A On the going market?
The Court: Yes. In round figures.
A Well, I'd have to -

The Court: Just a round figure.
A Oh, in round figures on comparing it with other
homes, I'd say maybe fifty-five.
This figure, quoted by respondent's witness, is $600
less than the $6100 for which the property was originally
sold.
Another of respondent's witnesses, George Judah,
testified ( R 64) that the home should go ''somewhere in
the neighborhood of around $7,000.00."
The record shows that appellants purchased a new
furnace in the spring· of 1956; that a heat survey was made
of the home an a furnace of reputable make, and larger
than would be considered adequate, was installed ( R 72,
73, 74). It is true that insulation should have been placed
in the attic, at the cost of $65 ( R 74), for greatest heat
efficiency. Respondent was informed of this at the time~
or shorty after, she purchased the home ( R 81, 82).
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Respondent testified that her change over to natural
gas was motivated by the cost of the propane gas - $43
per n1onth during the three coldest months ( R 47).
This testimony was refuted by that of Grant W.
Catnpbell who delivered gas to respondent and who produced bills showing the following charges for gas over a
period of 1 year ( R70, 71).

Q Did you deliver propane to the residence of Mrs.
Overn1an?
A Yes, tna'am.

Q And did you keep a record of the costs of heating?
.A I have the bills that she used while she was there,

heating.

Q And would you give us those figures?
The Cou1t: By month you mean?

Q Yes. Give us the figures that you have as to the
costs of heating.
A The figures that I have only carries for one year.

Q Well, that's fine.
A On October twelfth there was 250 gallons of propane delivered at a cost of $43.35. On December
19th there was 219 gallons delivered, $37.98. On
January 28th there was 245 gallons delivered,
$42.49.
The Court: What year is this?
A Fifty-six-fifty-seven.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q Are these deliveries to Mrs. Overman?
A Yes, rna'am.

Q All right.
A On March 16th is 225, $39.02. And on May 4th
was 250, October 2nd there was 171, $30.30.
A review of these figures reveals that respondent did
not pay $43 per month for propane gas for any one month
and that the average cost per month for one year was
approximated $17.10.
The evidence therefore shows that respondent did
not enhance the value of the home to the extent she testified ( R 56) by her installation of a new furnace and the
change over to natural gas.
The record also shows that some of the improvements
were made by respondent after the property was discovered not to be connected to a sewer line. ( R 41)

Q Now, you testified that you purchased materials
worth a hundred three dollars. Will you explain
to us what all that included? A storm doorA One hundred twenty-three dollars.

Q Yes, $123, excuse me.
A That included the celotex or plaster board, whatever it is, for the back porch, and the lumber for
the back porch, the two ceilings that had to be
put in, and the storm door.

Q And the labor was $81 for all those repairs?
A For all of the1n.
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Q

When did you put in the furnace, Mrs. Overman?

A It was the latter part of June or the first of July.

Q

When did you repair the steps?

A After the sewer was in.
tember.

Q

That was in late Sep-

When did you repair the cracked ceilings?

A At the same time as the steps were repaired.

Q

When did you put the storm door in?

A The satne time as the steps.

Q So all those improvements you made on your
home were made after the sewer was connected?
A That's right.
The Trial Court does not take into consideration in
its finding of Fact Number 7 and Conclusion of Law
Number 2, which Finding and Conclusion relate to the
making of improvements and the time the improvements
were made. The Court refers to the improvements having
been made prior to the time respondent was informed by
appellants of appellants' refusal to pay for the sewer and
to go along with the refinancing arrangements. However,
if respondent is seeking her remedy in rescission for misrepresentation, the proper measure of damages is set forth
in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 37, Page 624, Sections
141 and 142, entitled Nature of Contract and Nature of
Property:
The damages recoverable must have proximately resulted from the fraud.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Expenses unnecessarily incurred, as where voluntarily
incurred after discovery of the fraud, cannot be
recovered.
A defrauded person may recover such amount as will
compensate him for the loss occasioned by the fraud
and damages are ordinarily computed with reference
to the time and place of the transaction and fixed as
of the date on which the fraud was discovered.

POINT 1

c
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS, AS IS INDICATED BY
THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 5,
THAT THE RESPONDENT WAIVED ANY MISREPRESENTATION THERE MAY HAVE BEEN, AND
SHOWED BY HER ACTIONS THAT SHE ELECTED
TO SEEK DAMAGES, THE LAW IN SUCH CASES
BEING, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NU~1BERS 1 AND 3, THAT RESPONDENT THEN HAD NO RIGHT TO RESCIND.
That respondent did not intend, or express any intent,
to rescind the Escrow Agreement at any time, prior to the
filing of a counter claim ( Tr. 7) by her attorneys, is
clearly shown by respondent's own testimony (Def. Ex.
3, 5, 6; R 42, 43 )
A An then I told him that another thing had arisen
since my last letter, and that was the sewer had
gone out and - or that I had to connect to the
sewer, and I asked hiin what he wanted to do
about it.

Q You asked him what he wanted to do about it?
A Yes.
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Q Did you tell hhn that you didn't want to keep the
property any more since you had found out it
wasn't on the sewer?
A No.

Q Did you tell him you wanted all your money back
because you hadn't got what you bargained for?
A No.

Q

Now, after you had told Mr. E1isman that the
Sewer had gone out, in that letter, what did you
do next?

A I went ahead and negotiated for its repair.
couldn't live in the place as it was.

Q.

We

I see. But you intended on continuing to live in
the house?

A Yes.

Q

When did you decide, Mrs. Overman, that you
didn't want the property any more?

A I don't know whether I ever decided I didn't want
the property any more.
The law is clear that a vendee wishing to rescind must
give notice thereof and if she fails to do so within a reasonable length of time, or continues to act as though the
property were her own, she thereby waives any right she
may have had to rescind the Agreement, and must then
proceed with her legal remedy for damages.
"In Carpenter v. First Trust & Sav. Bank ( 1936) 54 P
( 2d) 495 (California), where it seems that the instalment purchaser had become entitled to rescind
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and recover back money paid ... it was held that since
(according to the findings of the trial court as supported by the evidence ) the purchaser, after discovery of the facts justifying rescission, had conducted
himself as though the contract subsisted and had
given assurance of being able to make his payments,
and his contention that his failure to rescind promptly
had resulted from assurances of the vendor's agent
that the improvements would be replaced, was, in
view of competent evidence, rejected by the trial
court, the right to rescind was lost."
134 ALR 1064

((.'A contract of purchase of land induced by false and
fradulent representations, or mutual mistake, is voidable and not void, and if injured party, \Vith knowledge of the false and fradulent representations, or
mutual mistake) exercises dominion over the property
and treats it as his own, he waives his right to rescind.
Kerns v. Bank of Manitou, 242 P. 2d 817 (Colorado.)
24 Am. Jur., Sec. 210, P. 36
'((.Rescission by a vendee implies that he must in some
way give notice of intention to rescind."
Hawkins vs. Stoffers ( 1929), P. 452 (Wyoming)
"A notice given by the vendee to the vendor which
was not intended as a rescission of the contract when
given, cannot be so considered thereafter.~,
Eckhause vs. Berwyn Estate ( 1929) 146 A 65 ( N. J.)
Where purchasers pf apartment units did not deliver
up the premises and demand down payment upon
discovery that premises allegedly were unfit for habitation as rental units, purchasers could not rely on
fraud to defeat action by vendors to recover possession and for forfeiture of amount paid under agreement to purchase. ((.'It should be observed that as to
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the premises being unfit for habitation as rental units,
the defendants upon the discovery of said conditions
failed to offer to deliver up the pren1ises and demand
the down pa yrncnt. If defendant intended to rely
up fraud as alleged, such action would have been
essential.
"Defendants can hardly be heard to say, "we know
we didn't carrv out our contract and we know that
we were give1; 18 months to try and comply with it,
and we know that plaintiffs didn't want the property
back, but we think that plaintiffs should take a further
loss and refund to us what we paid because we are
being penalized." We see no occasion for the intervention of equity to impose a further loss on plaintiffs,
nor can we see that the remedy of forfeiture, reluctantly accepted by plaintiff, is inequitable."
Peck vs. Judd, 326 P. 2nd 712; 7 Utah 2nd 420
See also 12 Am. Jur. - Contacts, Sec. 447, time when
right to rescind must be exercised, page 1029.
So, in view of the Court's Finding of Fact No. 5,
which Finding is a1nply supported by the testimony and
Exhibits pertaining to respondent's actions after discovering appellants' alleged misrepresentation, \vhich actions
come well within the puview of the numerous cases cited
above, the trial Court surely erred in entering its Conclusions of Law Numbers 1 and 3.
POINT 2
THAT THE PARTIES HAD IN FACT SIGNED AN
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT TO
PURCHASE, WHICI-I WAS A BINDING CONTRACT
UPON THE PARTIES, AND WHICH CONTRACT DID
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

NOT PURPORT TO CONVEY A HOUSE CONNECTED
TO A SEWER LINE.
This item merits special attention.
The preliminary contract signed by the parties (Pl.
Ex. 8) contains an integration clause, wherein the pa1ties
specifically agree that the terms thereof constitute the
entire preliminary contract between the purchaser and
seller and that no verbal statements made by anyone
relative to the transaction shall be construed to be a part
of the transaction.
Professor Ronan E. Degnan, had made an excellent
summarization of the Utah law on this point in his article
"Parol Evidence - Utah Version," 5 Utah Law Review,
No. 2, quoting from page 162:
"This final agreement is the agreement of the parties;
it is the jural act to which the law attributes changes
in legal relationships. In short, the later agreement
supersedes all former. Thus former negotiations or
even agreements are excluded from a trial not because
evidence as to their existence would be untrustwo1thy
but because they are legally immaterial; if their exexistence were proved or even admitted it would not
affect the rules of the law to be applied in dete1mining
the disposition of the case."

POINT 3
A

THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
OF FACT NUMBER 8 WHEREIN IT FOUND "THAT
EXCEPT AS ABOVE EXCEPTED ALL OF THE ALLE-
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CATIONS OF COUNTERCLAIM ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT AND TI-IOSE CONTAINED INTI-IE CO~·'l
PLAINT INCORRECT."
B

THE COURT FURTHER ERRED, IN MAKING ITS
CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 1 WHEREIN IT
STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO
A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE PREMISES WERE MATERIALLY MISREPRESENTED TO HER, FOR THE REASON AND ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONTRACT
RELIED UPON BY 'fi-lE D·EFENDANT HAD BEEN
PREVIOUSLY TERMINATED AS ALLEGED IN
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT (Tr. 1) AND AD·MITTED
IN DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM (Tr. 7)
The complaint of the plaintiffs alleges as follows
(Tr. 1):
"5. That upon the continuing default of the defendand, pursuant to the terms of said Escrow Agreement,
plaintiffs caused notice to be served upon defendant
on the 12th day of March, 1959, of the forefeiture and
termination of said Escrow Agreement, and requested
in said notice that defendant forthwith vacate said
. ''
pren11ses.
The answer of the defendant to this allegation was a
denial of any continuing default on the part of defendant,
and an admission of the balance of the said Paragraph 5
(Tr. 7).
Thus respondent has actually admitted the forfeiture
of the Escrow Agreement between the parties.
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-24That the fodeiture of the Escrow agreement was
properly carried out both with regard to the provisions
of the Escrow Agreement and the Laws of the State of
Utah, (Forcible Entry and Detainer, Title 78, Chapter 36,
Utah Code Annnotated, 1953) will appear from the
Notices which were served upon the respondent and the
escrow agent (Tr. 5, 6).
Respondent has denied in her answer (Tr. 7) a continuing default, and has also stated in her answer, as a
part of her further defense, that she immediately discontinued all payment under the agreement immediately
after discovering that the home had never been connected
to the City sewer line, thus inferring that she ceased making payments on the Escrow Agreement because of the
sewer trouble. The evidence contradicts this inference.
In the first place, she was behind two payments when she
made her last payment, and secondly, respondent, in her
own exhibit (De£. Ex. 6) states as follows:
"This month I will start reducing the balance due on
the contract by monthly payments but the home is to
be sold as soon as possible."
The necessary conclusion, then, is that the Escrow
Agreement having been legally and completely fodeited
by appellants because of the default of the respondent,
there was no existing contract for the Court to rescind, as
it purported to do in its said Conclusion of Law Number 1;
that is was, therefore, further error for the Cou1t to conclude, as it did in its conclusion of Law Number 3, that
the respondent could be restored to her former position,
and for the Cou1t to enter its Judgment and Decree declaring the contract to be null and void.
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The Minnesota case of West vs. vValker, ( 1930 ), 231
N. W. 826, 74 A. L. R. 165, though dealing with a fact
situation distinct from that of the present case, arrives
at a legal conclusion directly in point. The plaintiff there
had been induced to enter into a contract for the purchase
of a building and lot. He became delinquent in his payments, whereupon defendant, complying strictly with the
laws pertaining to forfeiture, cancelled the contract. The
plaintiff then brought action for damages, claiming fraud.
The Court held:
"We think the instant case is not distinguishable from
Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 126 Minn. 229, 148
N. W. 67, L. R. A. 1915F, 962, where it was held that
a right of action for damages for fradulent representations inducing the purchase of land upon executory
contract does not survive the cancellation of the contract. . . When the cancellation is completed, there
remains to neither vendee nor vendor any cause of
action against the other growing out of the land transaction, except that the vendee might sue for money
had and received. . . "
Thus the decision in the cited case would go beyond
the argument urged by appellants that a completed forfeiture of a contract terminates the contract, leaving no
valid agreement in existence to be rescinded, and holds
that not only would the contract be terminated by the
forfeiture, but that a plaintiff would also lose his remedy
at law for damages suffered because of any misrepresentations that may have been made in obtaining the contract.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, appellants respectfully request the
Court to reverse the decision of the Honorable Lewis Jones
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rescinding the contract between the parties hereto and
placing the respondent in status quo by awarding to her
all sums paid under the Escrow Agreement, less a reasonable rental, and the value of improvements placed upon
the premises by her, for the reasons and upon the grounds:
that even though the sewer listing was a misrepresentation,
respondent did not, by her actions, nor according to her
testimony, consider it material; that whether the home
was or was not connected to the sewer line did not animate
and control the conduct of the parties, nor determine the
fact of contracting, and was therefore not material; that
the parties had signed a preliminary contract for sale
which did not require appellants to deliver a home connected to the sewer, which contract contained the entire
agreement between the parties, and which could not be
altered by outside statements; that inasmuch as the Escrow Agreement had been forfeited by proper procedure,
there was no existing agreement for the District Trial
Court to declare rescinded by respondent; that the evidence is clear that respondent elected to recover her damages rather than avoid the agreement, until the time of
filing her counterclaim, and by her actions waived what
right she may have had to rescind the conrract; and for
the further reason that the sums awarded respondent for
her equity in the property and for the value of the improvements placed thereon by her cannot be justified by
the record.
Respectfully submitted,
Sherma Hansen.
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